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This paper investigates the impact of the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) as being observed in firms? FDI location choice decisions. Theoretically the 
BITs effect may well manifest itself, nevertheless it empirically remains ambiguous. The other vital limita-
tion of literatures should be obviously revealed by the limited empirical research on OFDI of emerging 
market countries (EMCs). In this study, we propose the following features to the BITs-FDI literature: (i) 
using firm-level data to focus on EMCs and explore the factors including BITs that determine EMCs? 
OFDI; (ii) a discrete choice model implemented by mixed logit to capture discrete investment decisions. 
With these features, we have performed an empirical analysis using firm-level data on the location choice 
of EMCs? OFDI over 2003?2015. Our empirical analysis results show that BITs significantly promote the 
OFDI of EMCs, is robust to applying different BITs variables and using different econometric models. 
Meanwhile we have found that, existing BITs involved in EMCs have a significant substitutive effect on 
the institutional environment of host countries, consistent with literatures of developed countries.
1.?Introduction
Over the past two decades, emerging market countries (EMCs) have witnessed rapid growth in their 
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). Although EMCs are mainly regarded as capital-importing 
economies, they have employed strategic adjustments to OFDI policies and constantly increased their 
OFDI flows, which suggests that EMCs are shifting from recipient countries to investor countries in 
terms of FDI. EMCs have increased their OFDI 20 times in just 15 years, the annual OFDI average for 
EMCs was only $22.9 billion before 2000, and it reached to $418.7 billion in 2015. Additionally, EMCs? 
inward FDI increased by 9.38% annually while their outward FDI rised by 18.15% correspondingly 
during the same period 2000?2015 (UNCTAD Stat 2017). The comparison fully demonstrates that 
EMCs? OFDI has soared in the past decade. China witnesses an evidently rapid growth of OFDI with 
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the fact that China was the second biggest capital-exporting country in 2015 (ranked only behind the 
U.S.) with an OFDI/IFDI ratio of 107.4%. Thus it can be seen, China is more likely to become a tradi-
tional capital-exporting developed country rather than a developing country. South Korea, Thailand, 
and India have also experienced a rapid growth in OFDI and become important capital exporters.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) are important agreements for FDI and play a dominant and deci-
sive role in today?s international direct investment flows (Bergstrand & Egger, 2013). Realizing the 
importance of BITs to FDI, EMCs began to reform the BITs system originally filled with capital-im-
porting in the process of making elementary OFDI investment policies. EMCs underwent a series of 
evolution in making international investment policies from simple capital-importing countries to capi-
tal-exporting countries in around 2000 (UNCTAD, 2000). Simultaneously, the BITs system of OFDI 
made relevant changes so as to actively adjust itself to serve OFDI policies. To be more specific, firstly 
EMCs are now paying more attention to the establishment of BITs with developing countries than 
those with developed countries, for the purpose of guiding the overseas distribution of EMCs? OFDI. 
The first BIT with EMC was made between Malaysia and Germany in 1960 and the treaty went into 
force in 1963. In terms of the 321 BITs established by EMCs in 1994, only 108 treaties were between 
EMCs or developing countries, accounting for less than a third of the total. This ratio rose to 50% in 
2008 when EMCs signed 607 treaties with the EMCs or developing countries. Secondly, EMCs perfects 
relevant clauses of some new or re-signed BITs to OFDI. For example, the BIT between China and 
Brunei in November 2000 absolutely mentioned several up-to-date standards of the national treatment 
for Chinese investors as well as for foreign investors. The similar provisions were also introduced in 
BITs with other countries during the same period, such as the Netherlands in 2001, Germany in 2003 
and Finland in 2004. Apparently these are meaningful changes in EMCs? BITs strategy. It is undoubt-
edly these resilient and open BITs strategy that has promoted the expansion of EMCs? OFDI, particu-
larly the one into developing countries.
Although there has been a rapid growth in OFDI and drastic BITs policy shifts by EMCs, few studies 
analyze whether and how BITs impact the OFDI of EMCs. There are two main reasons for this gap. 
First, the rapid growth of EMCs? OFDI has broken the usual pattern of international OFDI. Most 
research still regards developed countries as the capital-exporting countries and there is a lack of 
in-depth research on EMCs? OFDI. Second, although BITs are very important for the FDI of EMCs, 
studies focusing on EMCs usually treat BITs as an important way to attract inward FDI, ignoring the 
role of BITs in the OFDI of EMCs. We contribute to the literature by addressing two questions in this 
paper. First, we focus on the important topic of the rapid growth in EMCs? OFDI and the strategic 
transformation of BITs by exploring the investment determinants of EMCs? OFDI and the effect of 
BITs on EMCs? OFDI. Second, we use firm-level data in our analysis because macro data can mask the 
impact of BITs on firms by aggregating offsetting impacts across firms. We use a mixed logit model, 
which allows us to track and identify the investment behavior of the same enterprise in different years.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the impact of BITs on 
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FDI. Section 3 discusses our research method, develops our hypotheses and introduces the data that 
we use in our empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 
provides concluding remarks.
2.?Literature Review
Inspired by the rapid growth of OFDI by EMCs, there are many studies of the determinants of 
EMCs? OFDI. Theoretical perspectives that explain the patterns of FDI and multinational enterprise 
(MNE) activities include mainstream economic theories (Caves, 1974), internalization theories 
(Buckley & Casson, 1981) and Dunning?s eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1988, 2008). The most promi-
nent are internalization theory and the eclectic paradigm. Starting from these perspectives, the FDI 
and international business field literatures provide explanations for the internationalization of MNEs 
from developed countries (Demirbag et al., 2007). There is no single theory that is used to explain 
EMCs? OFDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007). In the past, when EMCs targeted other EMCs 
or developing countries, it was a more resource-oriented activity (Kumar, 1982; Lall, 1980; Wells, 
1983); EMCs targeted developed countries as more strategic assets (Buckley et al., 2007; Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008; UNCTAD, 2006). More recently, research on FDI from EMCs focuses on governance 
(Kelly et al., 2014; Urata, 2015). In the analysis of individual countries, such as when analyzing the 
determinants of Chinese OFDI, the institutional environment is still the focus (Amighini & Sanfilippo, 
2013; Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Kelly et al., 2014). As a result, enterprises pay close 
attention to the host country?s institutional environment. In this context, the host country?s institu-
tional environment is very important and how BITs directly affect the institutional environment of the 
host country affects the OFDI of enterprises in EMCs.
Compared with the many studies of OFDI determinants, the literature on how BITs affect EMCs is 
quite limited. Although studies find a significantly relationship between BITs and FDI, but the empir-
ical results in the literature are quietly mixed. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) empirically studies the 
impact of BITs on FDI by examining FDI flows from 20 member countries of the OECD to 31devel-
oping countries between 1980 and 2000, by using a fixed-effects estimator she finds that BITs do not 
have a significant impact on FDI. Moreover, she finds that countries with weak domestic institutions 
do not receive FDI as a result of BITs. Based on these findings, she argues that BITs act as more of a 
complement than a substitute for domestic institutions. This result suggests that contrary to theoretical 
expectations, BITs are complements to good institutional quality and do not perform their intended 
function of providing guarantees to foreign investors in the absence of good domestic institutions. 
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2011) examine FDI from OECD countries to 97 developing countries 
between 1984 and 2007 and find no significant impact of BITs on FDI.
In contrast to these studies, several studies find significantly positive impacts of BITs on FDI flows. 
Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) examine the impact of BITs on FDI inflow in two ways. One way is three 
cross-sectional analyses of FDI inflows to 99 developing countries in 1998, 1999, and 2000. The other 
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way is by analyzing the bilateral flow of FDI from the U.S. to 31 developing countries between 1991 
and 2000. Both methods include fixed effects and the results show that BITs with the U.S. are associ-
ated with higher FDI inflows while the number of BITs with other OECD countries is always statisti-
cally insignificant. Neumayer and Spess (2005) find that more BITs raise FDI flows to a developing 
country by examining FDI flows to 119 developing countries from 1970 to 2001. They find that BITs 
act as a substitute rather than a complement for domestic institutions, and claim that their results are 
robust to changes in the model specification and estimation technique. Egger and Merlo (2007) 
analyze both static and dynamic effects of BITs on FDI flows using bilateral FDI stock data covering 24 
home and 28 host countries between 1980 and 2001. Of the 28 countries, 22 are OECD members and 
10 are transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe. They find that both short-run and long-run 
estimates are statistically positive and the long-run estimates are significantly larger compared to the 
short-run estimates using a dynamic model GMM. Using a gravity model and various model specifica-
tions, Busse et al. (2010) analyze 28 OECD countries and 83 recipient developing countries from 1978 
to 2004 and find a positive impact of BITs on FDI flows. They claim that BITs can substitute for weak 
domestic institutions. More recently, Urata (2015) examines the FDI location choice of Japanese firms 
using firm-level data covering 97 countries from 1980 to 2012. He argues that Japan?s free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) have comprehensive coverage as they cover not only trade liberalization in the form of 
tariff eliminations or reductions but also FDI liberalization and facilitation in the form of granting 
foreign firms national treatment. Using a conditional logit model, he finds that FTAs with BITs posi-
tively impact Japan?s OFDI.
To summarize, we have found that on the one hand, the studies of the impact of BITs on OFDI of 
EMCs are disappoitingly insufficient, though the OFDI of EMCs has become an important trend of 
OFDI; on the other hand, the existing reseaches still give priority to country-level data, which would 
fatally lead to BITs? real effects between different enterprises being engulfed by the analystic results of 
the macro data. Therefore, we make every effort to perfect the literature by following ways: first, we 
focus on EMCs and explore the factors that determine EMCs? OFDI; second, we use the firm-level 
data to carry out our analysis to solve the unclear impacts caused by the present country-level data 
from other researchers. We use a mixed logit model with panel data for analysis, which allows us to 
track the investment behavior of enterprises in different years and find out whether there are differ-
ences in their investment preferences.
3.?Research Design
3.1?Dependent variable
We obtain firm-level investment information from the database of Zephyr, which is supported by 
Bureau van Dijk. Based on the classification system published by UNCTAD, we select 6 EMCs with 
high growth rates of OFDI and with available data: China, Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. We provide the host country list in the Appendix. The dependent variable is set to 1 if firm i 
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chooses to invest in country j and 0 otherwise.
Table 1 shows the investment details for each EMC between 20031 and 2015. From 2003 to 2008, the 
OFDI of EMCs increased rapidly, going from 249 to 435 in just five years. However, as a result of the 
American subprime mortgage crisis in 2009, OFDI dropped to 304. There was a big rebound in 2010, 
with the number of total cases rising to 359. The growth trend continued until 2015, when the number 
of investment projects reached 428. China?s OFDI investment grew the fastest, from 34 in 2003 to 198 
in 2015. Although the OFDI of India, Malaysia, and South Korea started early and reached 80, 80, and 
31, respectively, in 2003, their OFDI was relatively stable in the latter period. The OFDI of Indonesia 
and Thailand maintained a steady upward trend during 2003?2015.
3.2?Explanatory variables and Hypothesis
The BITs data are from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). We 
use whether a BIT has come into force in the estimations as an explanatory variable, with the variable 
(BITs) equal to 1 if the BIT is in force in the given year and 0 otherwise. Because the BITs reforms in 
emerging economies aim to promote to OFDI, our hypothesis is that BITs encourage enterprises in 
EMCs to carry out OFDI in host countries.
There is a long tradition of studies analyzing the effect of the institutional environment and invest-
ment risk on FDI (e.g., Wheeler & Mody, 1992; Urata & Kawai, 2000; Globerman & Shapiro, 2002). 
Hence, we include the institutional environment as our main explanatory variable and analyze its 
effect on EMCs? OFDI and how the interaction between the institutional environment and BITs influ-
1 On the one hand, due to the limitations of the database itself, we can only use data from 2003. On the other hand, the research 
object of this paper, such as OFDI of China, India mainly began in 2003. Therefore, the data from 2003 can meet the require-
ments of the empirical analysis of this study. 
Table 1.?Trends of Emerging markets Country?s Foreign Direct Investment, by Country
Country Total China India Malaysia Korea Thailand Indonesia Total
Year 1062 1305 1013 660 250 108 4398
2003   34  80   80  31  19   5  249
2004   54  64   89  54  13   3  277
2005   42 111   90  29  18   3  293
2006   60 153   57  38  10   9  327
2007   51 176   57  53  15   7  359
2008   54 198   93  54  19  17  435
2009   89  74   79  45   8   9  304
2010   70 107  100  50  24   8  359
2011  126  94   80  68  18   8  394
2012  103  67   79  73  18  11  351
2013   80  51   68  67  19  10  295
2014  101  51   83  56  27   9  327
2015  198  79   58  42  42   9  428
Source: Zephyr Database.
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ences EMCs? OFDI decisions. We measure the institutional environment of the host country with two 
variables. The first is inspired by Urata (2000), we use data from World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
which includes six indexes (voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regu-
latory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption), and synthesize a composite index (Composite 
political risk) that reflects the institutional quality of the host country. The second measure we use 
comes from Neumayer and Spess (2005), directly use the investment profile index (Investment profile) 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database as an institutional environment variable.2 
Following the literature, we hypothesize that the better the host country?s institutional environment, 
the more enterprises from EMCs will want to invest in host country. As for the interaction term 
between BITs and the institutional environment, we follow Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Urata 
(2015) in hypothesizing that BITs and the institutional environment are substitutes.
We control for variables like the ones used by Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Urata (2015). We 
include the natural log of per capita GDP (Ln GDP p.c.), the log of total population size (Ln popula-
tion), and the economic growth rate (Economic growth) as indicators of market size and market 
potential. We expect the estimated coefficients on these variables to be positive. The inflation rate 
(Inflation) is a proxy variable for macroeconomic stability, a high value indicates that there is a high 
risk of an economic crisis, and the coefficient is expected to be negative. The FDI inflow ratio (IFDI/
GDP Ratio) as a percent of GDP is a proxy variable for policymakers? openness to foreign investment, 
and we expect the coefficient to be positive. Our control variables? data are taken from the World Bank 
Indicators database (WBI, 2017).
3.3?Empirical methodology
The BITs effect on OFDI location choice may differ across firms. To incorporate firm heterogeneity, 
we use mixed logit (also called random-parameters logit) instead of conditional logit appearing FDI 
location choice studies. With mixed logit using panel data, we can allow for taste variation across firms 
as well as for unrestricted substitution patterns across choice locations. Our mixed logit model of FDI 
location choice is laid out as follows.
Similar to conditional logit which used in literature, the model can be associated with choice proba-
bilities since it is derived from a standard random utility-maximizing (or profit-maximizing) model 
(RUM), which is based on an assumption of utility-maximizing or profit-maximizing behavior of a 
decision maker. The profit that firm i obtains from choosing location j in period t (corresponding to a 
choice situation) is
piijt?β?ixijt?εijt, 
2 Each index varies from 0 to 100, with 100 representing a very low risk and 0 indicating a very high risk. As mentioned, the 
WGI index includes many items that are not strictly speaking relevant to institutional quality such as voice and accountability 
and control of corruption, therefore we carry out Principal Component Analysis. For the analysis, we calculate the first prin-
cipal component, which is constructed as a weighted average of the six indicators with similar weights. 
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xijt denote a vector of observed location-specific variables. Coefficient vector βi (i.e., parameters 
representing firm-specific tastes) is unobserved for each firm i and varies over firms rather than being 
fixed (for conditional logit), thereby firm heterogeneity is incorporated. Just as an aside, the specifica-
tion here does not permit the coefficients associated with each firm to vary over time, with the 
assumption that firms? tastes are stable over time.
Under the assumption of profit maximization, firm i chooses location j in period t provided that 
piijt?piijt?l?j and ?t; i.e., βi?xijt?βi?xikt?εikt?εijt. As usual, assume that the unobserved term εijt is an 
identically and independently distributed extreme value; then if we knew the value of βi, the choice 
probability would be standard logit. That is, conditional on βi, the probability that firm i chooses loca-
tion j in period t is given by
′
′= ∑
i ijt
i ijt
β x
ijt i β x
l
eL β
e
( )  ,
which is the conditional logit formula (Mufadden, 1974). If we know βi, the probability of firm i?s 
observed sequences of choice would be the product of logit formulas:
i ijt
i ijt
β x
ijt i β x
t l
eL β
e
( )
′
′
=∏  
While here we do not, however, know βi, hence the unconditional probability is the integral of the 
product over all possible values of βi weighted by the density of βi:
ij ij i i iL β f β dβP ( ) ( )=   
where f(βi) has parameters representing the mean and covariance of βi. Since the integral cannot be 
solved analytically, the choice probabilities are simulated by drawing values of βi from its distribution 
to obtain a simulated log likelihood function (SLL). The parameters are then estimated by maximizing 
the SLL (Train, 2009).
4.?Empirical Results
To mitigate potential reverse causality problems, we lag all explanatory variables by one period as in 
Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Urata (2015). We also carry out a comprehensive robustness test of 
the empirical results based on the mixed logit and conditional logit models and repeat the analysis 
using the BITs Quality Indicator as an instrumental variable for the BITs dummy variable. Table 2 
reports summary statistics together with a bivariate correlation matrix. According to the VIF results, 
there is no multicollinearity problem involving the variables.
4.1?Benchmark result
Our benchmark results of mixed logit estimation are shown in Table 3. Column 1 reports the results 
on control variables are generally consistent with our predictions. Only the inflation variable is insig-
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nificant, which indicates that the OFDI of EMCs may not respond enough attention to a host country?s 
high risk of economic crisis as investment decisions are not sensitive to inflation. In column 2, we 
report the test results of our hypothesis concerning BITs and OFDI, the estimated means of the BITs is 
consistent with our prediction that BITs are significantly positively correlated with EMCs? OFDI. The 
Table 3.?Benchmark estimation results
I II III IV
Mean STD.dev. Mean STD.dev. Mean STD.dev. Mean STD.dev.
BITs 0.237*** 1.687*** 1.255*** 1.486*** 3.154*** 1.540***
(0.052) (0.119) (0.119) (0.136) (0.196) (0.125)
ln GDP p.c. 0.885*** 0.669*** 0.886*** 0.660*** 0.686*** 0.604*** 0.514*** 0.509***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036)
ln population 0.646*** 0.258*** 0.635*** 0.240*** 0.614*** 0.237*** 0.602*** 0.210***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.019)
Economic growth 0.045*** 0.003 0.047*** 0.001 0.051*** 0.002 0.065*** 0.002
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Inflation 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
IFDI/GDP Ratio 0.011*** 0.000 0.012*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Composite political risk 0.020*** 0.006
(0.001) (0.004)
BITs*Composite political risk ?0.017*** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.004)
Investment profile 0.454*** 0.322***
(0.024) (0.024)
BITs*Investment profile ?0.284*** 0.014
(0.019) (0.024)
Log likelihood ?16257.8 ?16117.8 ?15997.6 ?15250
Observations 405,587 405,587 405,587 360,552
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Random coefficients are specified to be normally distributed.
Asterisks denote significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
Table 2.?Descriptive statistical variable information and bivariate correlation matrix
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
 I: OFDI Choice 1.000
 II: BITs 0.029 1.000
 III: ln GDP p.c. 0.056 0.212 1.000
 IV: ln population 0.080 0.115 ?0.317 1.000
 V: Economic growth ?0.007 ?0.076 ?0.304 0.095 1.000
 VI: Inflation 0.010 0.051 0.167 0.010 ?0.175 1.000
 VII: IFDI/GDP Ratio ?0.001 ?0.069 0.002 ?0.234 ?0.005 0.021 1.000
 VIII: Composite political risk 0.060 0.175 0.745 ?0.255 ?0.271 0.068 0.054 1.000
 IX: Investment profile 0.054 0.136 0.696 ?0.308 ?0.232 ?0.025 0.015 0.672 1.000
Obs. 461,790 461,790 457,786 461,790 459,636 438,643 435,153 457,392 409,014
Mean 0.010 0.307 8.873 16.315 4.260 93.853 4.909 47.211 8.872
Std. dev. 0.097 0.461 1.516 1.881 4.726 22.252 10.984 23.734 2.405
Min 0 0 5.602 10.393 ?33.101 15.348 ?58.326 1.946 1
Max 1 1 11.879 21.034 54.158 348.168 252.308 91.416 12
VIF 1.09 2.99 1.25 1.13 1.1 1.07 2.54 2.27
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estimated standard deviation of the BITs is also significant, indicating that the influence of BITs on 
investment decisions differs significantly across enterprises. The estimate results of the composite 
political risk and investment profile in columns 3 and 4 are significant positive respectively, mean that 
a favorable institutional environment in the host country significantly promotes FDI from EMCs. 
Moreover, the estimated results of the interaction between BITs and the institutional environment 
variables are significantly negative, which mean that BITs have a substitution effect on the host coun-
try?s institutional environment, consistent with the OFDI analysis results for developed countries of 
Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Urata (2015).
4.2?Robustness check
In Table 4, we report the results of a robustness test using a conditional logit model instead of a 
mixed logit model. Column 2 shows the result for the BITs and OFDI relationship, columns 3 and 4 
report the results for the impact of the institutional environment and the interaction term on OFDI 
decisions. The results are all consistent with the benchmark estimation results, indicating that our esti-
mation results are robust to different econometric models.
In Table 5, we report the results of a robustness test using the BITs Quality Indicator as the indepen-
dent variable. The original BITs quality indicator comprises of 11 different indexes which constructed 
Table 4. Robustness check with conditional logit
I II III IV
BITs 0.264*** 1.202*** 3.051***
(0.032) (0.095) (0.176)
ln GDP p.c. 0.691*** 0.691*** 0.484*** 0.449***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021)
ln population 0.625*** 0.628*** 0.609*** 0.617***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Economic growth 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.066***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Inflation ?0.000 ?0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
IFDI/GDP Ratio 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Composite political risk 0.023***
(0.001)
BITs*Composite political risk ?0.015***
(0.001)
Investment profile 0.360***
(0.017)
BITs*Investment profile ?0.273***
(0.017)
Log likelihood ?16554.28 ?16520.88 ?16353.929 ?15621.891
Observations 405,587 405,587 405,587 360,552
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Asterisks denote significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
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by Chaisse Julien and Bellak Christian (2011),3 we employed the mean value of the above indexes as 
the BITs quality indicator in this study. The higher the number, the more open the BITs. The estimation 
results using BITs Quality Indicators as the independent variable are consistent with the benchmark 
estimation results, indicating that our estimation results are robust to using different BITs variables.
4.3?Results for different host country?s feature
In this part we can distinguish host countries? feature whether they are developed countries or 
developing countries, and analysis the impact of BITs on defining different host countries feature. In 
Panel A of Table 6 we report the estimation results of our parameters associated with OFDI from 
EMCs to developed countries. As seen in column 2, BITs are not significant, which means that EMCs? 
BITs system has no significant impacts on OFDI from EMCs to developed countries. In Panel B of 
Table 6 considering the OFDI of EMCs to developing countries, the results for BITs are significantly 
positive (column 2), which means that BITs actively promote OFDI by EMCs when the host country is 
a developing country. As mentioned, BITs established by EMCs began to positively influence devel-
oping countries at an accelerating pace after 2000, which led to more attention being paid since then to 
3 The BITs Quality Indicator is constructed by Chaisse Julien and Bellak Christian (2011) and included 11 different index, 
named: Definition of investment, Admission establishment, National treatment, Most favored nation clause, Fair and equi-
table treatment, Direct and indirect expropriation covered, free transfer of investment-related funds, Non-economic stan-
dards, Investor-State dispute mechanism, Umbrella clause, Temporal scope of application, respectively. Each index ranges 
from 0 to 2, with 2 representing a very open BITs and 0 indicating an insufficiently open BITs.
Table 5.?Robustness check with alternative BITs variable
I II III IV
Mean STD.dev. Mean STD.dev. Mean STD.dev. Mean STD.dev.
BITs Index 0.131*** 0.890*** 0.708*** 0.737*** 1.737*** 0.821***
(0.029) (0.063) (0.071) (0.081) (0.112) (0.066)
ln GDP p.c. 0.885*** 0.669*** 0.881*** 0.654*** 0.687*** 0.601*** 0.508*** 0.482***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034)
ln population 0.646*** 0.258*** 0.634*** 0.243*** 0.614*** 0.240*** 0.603*** 0.211***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.020)
Economic growth 0.045*** 0.003 0.047*** 0.001 0.051*** 0.002 0.065*** 0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Inflation 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
IFDI/GDP Ratio 0.011*** 0.000 0.012*** 0.000 0.011*** 0.000 0.013*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Composite political risk 0.019*** 0.006
(0.001) (0.004)
BITs Index*Composite political risk ?0.010*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.002)
Investment profile 0.445*** 0.325***
(0.024) (0.024)
BITs Index*Investment profile ?0.156*** 0.015
(0.011) (0.011)
Log likelihood ?16257.8 ?16134.4 ?16024.8 ?15295.7
Observations 405,587 405,587 405,587 360,552
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Random coefficients are specified to be normally distributed.
Asterisks denote significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
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the promotion effect of BITs on OFDI. Therefore, our results, in response to EMCs? BITs strategy 
adjustments, confirm the effect of EMCs? BITs reform. However, our results also indicate that the 
existing BITs system has little effect on EMCs? OFDI in developed countries. Therefore, EMCs needs 
Table 6.?Results for different host country?s feature
I II III IV
Mean STD.dev. Mean STD.dev. Mean STD.dev. Mean STD.dev.
A: Developed Countries
BITs 0.056 1.924*** 1.328** 1.872*** 1.913*** 1.575***
(0.086) (0.195) (0.519) (0.210) (0.656) (0.265)
ln GDP p.c. 1.257*** 0.022 1.285*** 0.03 0.923*** 0.143 1.364*** 0.031
(0.084) (0.142) (0.092) (0.141) (0.123) (0.184) (0.097) (0.125)
ln population 0.814*** 0.179*** 0.833*** 0.175*** 0.891*** 0.194*** 0.833*** 0.176***
(0.018) (0.037) (0.022) (0.044) (0.028) (0.053) (0.023) (0.045)
Economic growth 0.082*** 0.134*** 0.088*** 0.129*** 0.066*** 0.165*** 0.098*** 0.106**
(0.017) (0.029) (0.018) (0.035) (0.018) (0.032) (0.018) (0.043)
Inflation ?0.035*** 0.022 ?0.033*** 0.013 ?0.038*** 0.033** ?0.033*** 0.032**
(0.007) (0.024) (0.008) (0.044) (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015)
IFDI/GDP Ratio 0.008*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.002 0.006* 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Composite political risk 0.050*** 0.030***
(0.008) (0.006)
BITs*Composite political risk ?0.017*** 0.005
(0.007) (0.005)
Investment profile 0.056 0.156**
(0.051) (0.068)
BITs*Investment profile ?0.165*** 0.100***
(0.058) (0.027)
Log likelihood ?5623.499 ?5556.11 ?5507.315 ?5547.551
Observations 55,978 55,978 55,978 55,978
B: Developing Countries
BITs 0.746*** 1.649*** 2.273*** 1.502*** 3.255*** 1.641***
(0.077) (0.204) (0.208) (0.209) (0.257) (0.179)
ln GDP p.c. 0.880*** 0.792*** 0.833*** 0.738*** 0.673*** 0.713*** 0.527*** 0.552***
(0.035) (0.047) (0.037) (0.048) (0.036) (0.058) (0.039) (0.065)
ln population 0.719*** 0.221*** 0.656*** 0.179*** 0.664*** 0.172*** 0.735*** 0.086**
(0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.030) (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.034)
Economic growth 0.019*** 0.000 0.020*** 0.002 0.013** 0.003 0.035*** 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Inflation 0.005*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.000 0.009*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IFDI/GDP Ratio 0.077*** 0.001 0.081*** 0.001 0.077*** 0.002 0.074*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Composite political risk 0.025*** 0.009
(0.002) (0.008)
BITs*Composite political risk ?0.035*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.006)
Investment profile 0.471*** 0.406***
(0.028) (0.033)
BITs*Investment profile ?0.281*** 0.015
(0.028) (0.024)
Log likelihood ?7302.013 ?7142.18 ?7019.096 ?6355.594
Observations 146,018 146,018 146,018 122,258
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Asterisks denote significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1.
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to establish a more open and flexible BITs system that is conducive to OFDI to developed countries to 
meet the its rapid growth.
5.?Concluding Remarks
FDI is of great importance to one?s home country as well as the host country (Neumayer & Spess, 
2005; Urata, 2015). With the rapid growth of OFDI of EMCs, EMCs is widening its fields in partici-
pating the world economy via OFDI. Under such circumstances, it seems more important to deeply 
study OFDI of EMCs. Howerver, the existing researches are relatively limited, especially the lack of 
detailed affecting factors of OFDI of EMCs. In view of above, this paper analyzed the impacts of 
EMCs? BITs on foreign direct investment of EMCs? firms by examining the data covering 105 countries 
during the 2003?2015 period. The main empirical results are as follows. First, as an important factor 
affecting FDI, BITs significantly promote the OFDI of EMCs and this estimation result is robust in 
using different BITs variables and different econometric models. Second, existing BITs of EMCs have a 
significant substitution effect on the institutional environment of host countries, which is consistent 
with literatures of developed countries. Third, the impact of BITs on OFDI is different from host coun-
tries? feature, our estimation results show that BITs significantly promote EMCs? OFDI to developing 
countries, which barely influences a developed country.
The empirical results of this paper supported EMCs?active and open BITs strategic adjustments 
played a significant role in promoting OFDI, especially the EMCs?OFDI to developing countries. 
Therefore, in terms of policies suggestions, EMCs need to make further efforts to perfect BITS with 
developed countries, so as to meet to rapid growth of OFDI as well as its reasonable global distribu-
tion. At last, although we analyze the determinants of OFDI by EMCs and examine how BITs affect 
EMCs? OFDI, there is still issues for further study. With the deepening of EMCs? reform of BITs, more 
attention is being paid to the effect of BIT heterogeneity on OFDI, though we do not distinguish 
heterogeneity between different BITs in this paper. In addition, the differentiation of enterprises? 
heterogeneity could bring variant effects on BITs? locational choice to OFDI. Therefore, it needs 
further study in considering the impact of BITs heterogeneity and investing firm heterogeneity on 
OFDI locational choice.
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